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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
APPELLATE PRACTICE-FAILURE TO NARRATE THE EVIDENCE-GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL-The plaintiff filed a motion to modify a divorce decree with
reference to maintenance, alimony and custody of a minor child. On the
appeal the plaintiff sent up all the evidence in question-and-answer form.
Held: On motion by the defendant, appeal dismissed for failure to comply
with Rule 15 of the Springfield Court of Appeals, providing in part, "The
evidence of witnesses shall be stated in narrative form, except when the
questions and answers are necessary to a complete understanding of the
evidence.",
The modern trend of liberality in enforcing the rules of the appellate
courts originated in Missouri after the decision of Barham v. Skelton, 2 so
that now even commingling the abstract of the record proper and the bill of
exceptions is not sufficient reason for dismissal. 3 This liberality of constru-
ing the rules had been adopted by the Springfield Court of Appeals.4 In-
deed the Court has consistently attempted to dispose of all cases on their
merits rather than on questions of appellate practice,5 thereby preventing
injustice through technicalities. For a time, whether the point was or was
not raised, the Court, even in cases of flagrant violation, waived infractions
of the rules and considered cases as best it could.6 In one such instance,
however, the Court issued a warning after reading a long record in question-
and-answer form that the rules had not been abandoned and should be
followed as consistently as possible7 Shortly thereafter the Court apolo-
getically dismissed an appeal where the appellant utterly disregarded the
rules in the preparation of the abstract of the record, and was taken to
task in a dissenting opinion for its about-face when the bar generally had
been led to expect great liberality in regard thereto.8 The identical question
under consideration, that is, the failure to narrate the evidence, was then
squarely presented to the Court in a later case. The Court admitted the
violation of the rules but declined to assess the penalty of dismissal. 9 Since
IMarx v. Marx (1935 Mo. App.) 88 S. W. (2d) 1018; Rule 21 of the
Springfield Court of Appeals justifies dismissal, for failure to comply with
Rule 15.
2 Barham v. Skelton (1909) 221 Mo. 66, 119 S. W. 1089.
a Nokes v. Nokes (1928 Mo. App.) 8 S. W. (2d) 879; Moore & Farrar
v. Wyatt et al. (1928 Mo. App.) 8 S. W. (2d) 1020.
4 Nokes v. Nokes (1928 Mo. App.) 8 S. W. (2d) 879.
5 Nokes v. Nokes (1928 Mo. App.) 8 S. W. (2d) 879; Hummell v. Field,
1923. 216 Mo. App. 136, 256 S. W. 515.
6 Whitesell v. Pioneer Const. Co. (1928 Mo. App.) 2 S. W. (2d) 147; Sav-
age v. Purcell (1928 Mo. App.) 9 S. W. (2d) 823.
7 Fredericksen v. Farmers State Bank of Branson (1929 Mo. App.) 19
S. W. (2d) 303.
8 Harrison v. Lindley, et al. (1929 Mo. App.) 20 S. W. (2d) 958.
Dyer v. Brown, 1930, (1930. Mo. App.) 25 S. W. (2d) 551.
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this decision the Court has reiterated both liberality10 and strictness11 in
enforcing the rules.
The rules of the Missouri Supreme Court prior to March 22, 1924, pro-
vided in part that,12 "the evidence of witnesses shall be in narrative form
except when the questions and answers are necessary to a complete under-
standing of the testimony." This is the identical language of that part of
Rule 15 of the Springfield Court of Appeals, the infraction of which war-
ranted dismissing the appeal in the case under consideration. Where the
failure to comply with this rule has been involved, the Supreme Court has
given a most liberal interpretation, expressly holding that the word "shall"
was not used in a mandatory sense. 13 (The very fTct that the rule leaves
it to counsel to determine when they should present the evidence in narra-
tive form and when by question-and-answer demonstrates that "shall" was
not used in a mandatory sense.) It was not the intention to compel him,
the lawyer, to abstract his case at his peril, and have the Court try abs-
tracts rather than the cases of litigants.14 That such was the intention of
the Supreme Court is further demonstrated by the fact that on March 22,
1924, the rule was amended by changing the word "shall" to "may,"1 so
that even greater liberality is now permitted.' 6 The instant case especially
commends itself for liberal handling since it is triable de novo on appeal"
and moreover the rights of an infant, a favorite ward of the Court, are
involved.18
When a cause in an appellate court rides off on a question falling short
of the merits it must needs be a matter of solicitude. However, the rules
of appellate practice fill no office of mere red tape, but on the contrary they
have substance, the obvious purpose of which is to aid in getting at the
right of a cause. Present-day thought has suggested the use of the bill of
exceptions as prepared by the court stenographer. 19 The reasons advanced
are that such a record is practically perfect, more easily understood by the
30 Sechrist et al. v. Hufty Rock Asphalt Co., (1933. Mo. App.) 59 S. W.
(2d) 767; Bedell v. Garton, et al., (1934. Mo. App.) 70 S. W. (2d) 373.
21 Bollinger v. New Era Publishing Co., (1934. Mo. App.) 68 S. W. (2d)
725.
12 See Rule 13 Missouri Supreme Court, 291 Mo., Page ii.
13 Frohman v. Lowenstein (1924) 303 Mo. 339, 260 S. W. 460; Vaughn
v. Vaughn 251 Mo. 445, 158 S. W. 345.
14 Supra note 13.
15 See Rule 13, Missouri Supreme Court 305 Mo., Page ii.
10 Davoren et al. v. Kansas City (1925 Mo. Sup.) 273 S. W. 501; Sims
v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co. (1925) 323 Mo. 447, 19 S. W. (2d) 294; Smith
v. Lammert (1931 Mo. Sup.) 41 S. W. (2d) 791; Church et al. v. Combs
et al. (1933) 332 Mo. 334, 58 S. W. (2d) 467; State ex rel and to use of
Park National Bank v. Globe Indemnity Co. et al. (1933) 333 Mo. 461, 62
S. W. (2d) 1065; Werminghaus v. Eberle (1935 Mo. Sup.) 81 S. W. (2d)
607.
17 Kistner v. Kistner (1936 Mo. App.) 89 S. W. (2d) 106.
18 Meredith v. Krauthoff (1915) 191 Mo. AIp. 149, 177 S. W. 1112;
Eaton v. Eaton (1922 Mo. App.) 237 S. W. 896; Hayes v. Hayes (1934 Mo.
App.) 75 S. W. (2d) 614.
29 (1933) 17 Jour. Am. Jud. Soc. 87-91.
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Court, and less expensive to the litigants. 20 It is submitted that a just rule
fairly interpreted and enforced, wrongs no man. Ostensibly to be obeyed,
but actually not enforced, it necessarily wrongs some men, viz: those who
labor to obey it-the very ones it should not injure.21 It is well to note here
that the Kansas City Court of Appeals, with similar rules, has repeatedly
held in like cases, that the failure to bring up and present the evidence in
haec verba forfeits the right to appellate review.
2
J. L. A. '37.
ATTORNEYS - CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DISBARMENT - STATUTE OF LIIVITA-
TIONs.-A Minnesota statute provided that "no proceeding for the removal
or suspension of an attorney at law shall be instituted unless commenced
within the period of two years from the date of the commission of the
offense or misconduct or within one year after the discovery thereof."' In
the case of In re Ithamar Tracy the supreme court of Minnesota on March
27, 1936, declared this statute to be unconstitutional as a projection of the
legislative power into the judicial department. 2
Certain inherent powers have been given by the state and federal consti-
tutions to the courts as a result of the separation of powers provided for
in the respective constitutions. Among these inherent powers is that of
regulating the admission and disbarment of lawyers. 3 Although the former
power is not universally admitted to be an inherent power of the court,
4
the power to disbar is, in almost all jurisdictions, so recognized.5 No stat-
ute, rule, or constitutional provision is necessary to authorize the striking
off the roles of attorneys in proper cases. 6 Missouri is one of the many
states which follows this prevailing rule.7
The matter of trial by jury in disbarment cases presents a similar prob-
lem to that presented by a statute of limitations in such actions. A disbar-
ment proceeding being summarys in nature, a jury trial cannot be de-
manded as a matter of right.9 Only in those states in which a disbarment
20 Supra note 19.
21 Sullivan v. Halbrook (1908) 211 Mo. 99.
2 Nichols v. Nichols (1889) 39 Mo. App. 293; Hull v. Hull (1912) 168
Mo. App. 220, 153. S. W. 531; Gorka v. Gorka (1927) 221 Mo. App. 1033,
295 S. W. 515; Chronos v. Panagos (1928 Mo. App.) 7 S. W. (2d) 734;
McKitterick v. McKitterick (1933) 227 Mo. App. 1002, 60 S. W. (2d) 671.
1 Mason's Minn. St. 1927, sec. 5697-2.
'In re Tracy (Mar. 27, 1936) 2 Law Week 739.
3 Ex parte Wall (1882) 107 U. S. 265; Shanfeld, "The Scope of the
Judicial Independence of the Legislature in Matters of Procedure and Con-
trol of the Bar," 19 ST L. LAW REV. 163; Weeks, On Attorneys at Law,
sec. 80, p. 140; 2 R. C. L. 1086; 6 C. J. 580.
4 State v. Raynolds (1916) 22 N. M. 1, 158 Pac. 413.
r Supra, note 3.
6 Weeks, op. cit.
7 In re Richards (1933) 330 Mo. 907, 63 S. W. (2) 672, 19 ST. L. LAW.
REV. 146; In re Sparrow (1935) 90 S. W. (2) 401.
R See 6 C. J. 602.
9 Ex p. Wall (1882) 107 U. S. 265; In re Norris (1899) 60 Kans. 649,
57 Pac. 528; State v. Fourchy (1901) 106 La. 743, 31 So. 325; In re Carver
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